A Definition of Economics?

(good piece)

—“Hi Curt…I can relate to your comments. Perhaps you mentioned it and I missed it, but what in your definition of “Economics”. Is it sociological? A physical science? Something else?”—Lee Roesner


Great question. Thanks.

I think, that the scope of the term Economics is an interesting question, because we can discuss the etymological, normative, technical, and ‘necessary’ properties of the discipline. And by ‘necessary’, those properties that distinguish the discipline from other fields of inquiry.

If we look at the etymology, the term evolved from running the household, then the nation, then an abstract discipline that studies the behavior mankind’s production, distribution and trade, chiefly by studying demonstrated preferences recorded as monetary transactions.

If we look at how it is practiced, I think that today it is practiced as a social science, and that accusations of ‘economic imperialism’ in social science are probably justified: that economics has evolved into the dominant social science, and that experimental psychology and cognitive science, together have evolved as the dominant individual science. This appears to be the current state of affairs, where experimental psychology and cognitive science focus on our biases and limits, while economics focuses on the effect of those behaviors in the aggregate. And I think that the people in both disciplines expect to meet in the middle with a theory of mankind. (The problem is, that this merely justifies intervention – how to fool people.)

Now, I tend to look at disciplines by necessary properties, and I view economics as the study of institutional (both formal and informal) means by which we facilitate human cooperation in pursuit of prosperity. This is traditionally called political economy.

So the problem is that if we study it as how we can manipulate man’s biases, I think that is immoral on objective grounds, because it violates the principle of voluntary exchange (imposition of costs). Whereas if we study it as political economy, then we retain the moral constraint that all exchanges must be voluntary. We don’t try to fool people, we try to create transparency – to reduce friction, not to fool them that risk is lower than it appears.

This is why I try to stay on message with the statement “Every forced involuntary transfer is a lost opportunity for mutually beneficial exchange.” Because I prefer that economics be constructed and performed as an analysis of moral and voluntary cooperation in the western tradition, rather than an immoral and involuntary analysis in the eastern tradition. And also, because I agree with the Austrian theory of the business cycle: that all attempts to cushion the rate of reorganization of the economy, merely exacerbate the problem by funding the existing (exhausted) order.

So, I define economics as the study of morality: the study of the means of human cooperation in pursuit of the production of informal and formal institutions that assist us in cooperating. And as such I see law – the capture of normative constraints on involuntary transfer – as a subset of economics. And in practice I see the purpose of economics as little more than the justification of common, polycentric, organically evolved, law.

And I see economics as dependent upon experimental psychology, and cognitive science for the study of man’s actions. This is because these disciplines have proven extremely fruitful in exposing the numerous and extensive limitations to human reason.

I think this framing of the disciplines and the scope of the terms, is difficult to argue with – honestly that is.

Thanks for the great question.

Curt Doolittle 

The Propertarian Institute

L’viv, Ukraine.


Learning From Debating Moral But Misguided People

—“What is unscientific is the claim that a subjective being can be represented by a method that does not recognize subjectivity. No data can contain the information that it ‘supposedly’ contains. This is misrepresentation. And no person can interpret the data associated with another person since they are not that person at that time and place. This is not science it is hearsay. …. What the hermeneutic does not realize or care to reveal is that there is no alternative to the methodology of subjectivism in the human sciences if science is the pursuit. Science is not the captive of methodology but rather methodology (and it has to be the correct one) is the lens of science.”—Bruce Koerber


You know, you seem like a moral man, a deeply sentimental moral man, and I really don’t like fighting with moral men. But I have a job to do. And I think it’s an important job. And frankly you aren’t a problem because you are visibly a moral man. Like a wondering christian missionary you are trying to do good albeit doing good with mythology. And really, mythology is enough for simple people. Mythology conveys meaning by analogy. Meaning is all that is available to them since truth is too complicated for them to access and convert into new meaning. Truth devoid of meaning is expensive. Mentally expensive. And time intensive.

So I am sorry that I stepped on you in the FB forum. In my world I am just doing my job. And I think it is an important one: to rescue moral economics from the lunatic fringe, by restating it scientifically – meaning truthfully. But it’s my moral duty, as a moral man, to do this job. That is how I see it.

So lets look at your argument here and I’ll expose it for what it is:

–“What is unscientific is the claim that a subjective being can be represented by a method that does not recognize subjectivity.”—

—“No data can contain the information that it ‘supposedly’ contains.”—

No one supposes data contains anything. That is a false argument. Facts exist within theories. They correspond to theories or they do not correspond to theories. We ether seek to falsify theories (criticism) or we seek to ‘support’ theories (confirmation bias). If we seek to falsify a theory and the result does not falsify it, but continues to confirm it, then the theory survives. Some theories defeat other theories by this means. And we largely defeat theories by narrowing their scope (parsimony). Because few theories outside of the mystical are non-correspondent (that is why we come up with them), but they fail under criticism (they are insufficiently correspondent). So the argument you are making assumes positivism not observation and criticism. Science progresses not through positivism, but through observation (empiricism) and criticism, in which we attempt to launder imaginary relations (content) from our theories, so that what remains is truth candidate.

—“This is misrepresentation. And no person can interpret the data associated with another person since they are not that person at that time and place. This is not science it is hearsay. “—

If this is true then no study of deductive human action is possible – you have falsified your how hypothesis. Instead, your statement is only true at the experiential level not at the demonstrated level. We cannot predict an individuals action at any given moment, but we can do two things (a) explain it afterward given the conditions – or at least falsify some large number of the possibilities (b) collect records of preferences demonstrated under similar conditions. So like any empirical observation we cannot predict the state of any very small thing (a molecule of hydrogen in a cloud), however, we can construct general rules of aggregate movements (we can describe cloud formation, and we can describe general rules of human aggregate behavior in an economy: economic laws).

—“What the hermeneutic does not realize or care to reveal is that there is no alternative to the methodology of subjectivism in the human sciences if science is the pursuit. Science is not the captive of methodology but rather methodology (and it has to be the correct one) is the lens of science.”—

This is demonstrably false. While we may not claim something is true unless we can explain it as a series of possible (rational, arational and irrational) human actions, (and in Propertarianism, further constrained by fully informed voluntary exchange), meaning that we have subjected it to operational and intuitionistic (subjective) testing, we certainly CAN use empirical observations in an attempt to understand the phenomenon that we cannot deduce.
This does not mean that you cannot attempt to perform deductive analysis and research. It means that you cannot claim empirical analysis is unscientific, nor that economic analysis must be constrained to the deductive.

This is why economics is no different from any other discipline. Truthful testimony must follow the same constraints no matter what discipline we discover. However, certain disciplines study different properties, and as such some disciplines such as chemistry rarely place contingency upon involuntary transfer (morality) and some such as economics and law always place contingency upon involuntary transfer. As such, in chemistry moral proof is an infrequent necessity, while as in economics it is a permanent necessity.

As I have stated, (a) science is a moral discipline enumerating warranties that must be given for truthful testimony, (b) economics is bound by those same morals, and (c) operationalism and intuitionism are necessary constraints in all fields, and (d) morality is a necessary constraint in many fields – just less visible).

Likewise internal consistency is necessary in mathematics, but external correspondence isn’t. Whereas in physics internal consistency and external correspondence and operational definitions are necessary, but morality is rarely a consideration. Whereas in economics, internal consistency, external correspondence, operational construction (proof of existence/falsification against imagination) and morality (falsification of involuntary transfer) are always necessary.

This approach justifies Austrian economics, as a scientific and moral discipline. Whereas the misesian/rothbardian/hoppeian claims are both pseudoscientific and false both logically and demonstrably.

So you see, I am trying to save Austrian Economics from the lunatic fringe by restating it as the moral discipline, consistent with all other disciplines, and where all disciplines are equally constrained by moral warranty.

This is a profound innovation, and reconstruction of western thought and you should ponder it.




Philosophy, Morality, Science, and Law Should Be Identical Propositions

If philosophy, morality, science, and law are not identical propositions then something is very wrong. Because philosophy morality science and law can be constructed as identical propositions. Because truthful, due-diligent, warrantable, speech is consistent regardless of the discipline in which we utter it.


Turning Rationalism On Its Head

(from elsewhere)

Thanks Andrew:

In regard to my statement:

—“So no statement that is not open to sympathetic testing (falsification) by operational means (sympathetic testing) can be ‘true’, nor ‘scientific’ since ‘scientific’ refers to morally warrantable constraint upon one’s statements.”—

You argue:

–“It is important to consider if this statement itself is scientific or ‘true’ by its own terms. “–

Well, this is a rationalist position, not a scientific position. So what is important to a person who justifies arguments to see if they are true (a rationalist), and a person who criticizes hypotheses to see if they are provide predictive results (a scientist) is considerably different.

A frequent fallacy of philosophical argument is that there are two, not three arguments. They are 1) Rationalist, 2) Empiricist, and 3) Scientific. 1 and 2 are philosophical justifications. 3 is not. It merely seeks what works. Philosophers attempt quite often to cast as justificationary (under their control) that which does not seek justification, but only seeks to perform.

A scientist seeks to testify that he has done due diligence, he does not seek to make true statements. After his due diligence, and after the community’s due diligence, that which survives remains hypothesis theory or law.

Science is not philosophical, but like law, practical. By practical application law evolves, and by practical applicatoin, science evolves. We philosophers attempt to explain this, but we do not inform science. We inform others about the progress of science. (Which in itself is an interesting phenomenon.)

Science then does not bear a burden of analytic truth. It bears only its evolved polycentric, normative, laws against error, bias, and deception in the presentation of theories. Those laws are often poorly articulated (outside of experimental psychology). We can analyze those laws and translate them into philosophical terms as a warranty (promise) that theories are:

  • i) internally consistent (logical)
  • ii) externally correspondent (correlative)
  • iii) empirical (observable)
  • iv) operational (existentially possible)
  • v) falsifiable
  • vi) reasonably falsified

Now, a good critical rationalist would say that all those criteria are means of falsification (criticism), not justifications, as most rationalists would attempt to assert. However, I see this as again, non-performative (verbalist) rationalist language. And instead that these are our evolved conditions of intellectual warranty, that have survived the test of time by eliminating error, bias, and deception.

(a) “is the statement falsifiable?”
My statement is reducible to “only existentially possible human operations – whether mental or physical – can exist”. This is a metaphysical not epistemological assertion. So the proposition that we must falsify a metaphysical statement is inapplicable. Without this stipulation no further argument is possible on any grounds.

Just for fun: If we could state that existentially impossible human actions can exist, then yes it is falsifiable. Just as if we state that existentially impossible mathematical operations can exist. While both of these things are hard to conceive of, that does not mean that they cannot be constructed, just as we did not imaging that length was a local rather than absolute concept. (Einstein/Brouwer). all premises are theoretical, even metaphysical premises.

Can something demonstrably exist, and can such a thing be observable? Since (this is the point of empiricist arguments) we can both sympathize with one another (or we could not cooperate on intentions) and observe our own reaction to incentive-producing phenomenon, we can in fact, make internal observations, and we can collect external, empirical observations from others. (We do. All the time. In many disciplines. )

Now it is possible that say, the quantum theory of subconscious communication is possible, but that would only state that we were not conscious, not that we reacted to incentives (information). And that we could not observe it, just as we cannot observe many of our intuitionistic functions of the mind. They are hidden from us.

(b) “Not being an empirical statement, it cannot itself be empirically tested.”

Well, it being a metaphysical statement that is its definition.

But that said, this is a good example of the rationalist fallacy. Given that empirical means observable, that I know of, we cannot make non-empirical statements. This is the debate between empiricism and rationalism. Measurements are empirical observations. Internal observations of our own sensations are empirical observations. The question is whether we insert error, bias, and deception into those observations. We are not trying to assert observations are true, we are trying to assert that observations are reasonably free of all possible error, bias, and deception.

Moreover, isolating and constructing a demonstrative test is useful only in those circumstances where we seek to uncover first principles (reduce variables). Not in those cases where we seek to discover emergent phenomenon in fully informed (existential) reality, in real time (study variables). Economics requires the latter. In physics the former. In economics we can subjectively test incentives – that is why we can cooperate, and why apes don’t (well). It is why we can use juries in courts. But we cannot deduce from incentives all possible emergent economic phenomenon, which while based upon simple rules produces fractal results (emergent complexity we cannot anticipate). In physics by contrast we do not know the first principles – we cannot empathize or sympathize with the physical universe (yet).

Another rationalist fallacy: it is MORE accurate to collect unintentionally constructed data and see if it fits your model, than it is to construct an experiment and intentionally construct data. This is one of the benefits of economic data over other tests: we collect demonstrated preferences (performatively-true testimonies). Whereas we have demonstrated that we cannot collect performatively-true testimonies in most cases because of error bias and deception.

(c) “There is the question of science vs. orthodoxy.”
Orthodoxy is a justificationist position not a scientific one.
So, actually, the question is normative (as practiced), juridical(survives criticism), and metaphysical(existentially possible). Philosophy as practiced is largely justificationary for ancient reasons. Science is demonstrative and theoretical for equally ancient reasons – largely to avoid the politically normative, which is highly loaded with error, bias and deception.

For this reason it behooves us to recognize that philosophy as practiced is a political activity, not a scientific one. That is why the most sophisticated deceptions in history have been constructed via rationalist means. First monotheism was developed argumentatively as an authoritarian vehicle. Next philosophical argument. Then pseudoscientific. Finally postmodern abandoned all truth and reason.

So the problem is not that science, must meet philosophical standards, but that rationalists must prove that they do not practice world history’s most successful art of lying, bias, and error. Since most great deceptions were carried out by rationalist rather than scientific means. Not the least of which were the church’s integration of aristotelianism, Rousseau’s justification and responsibility for the horrors of the revolution, Kant’s authoritarianism and responsibility for making marxism possible, marx’s responsibility for the death of 100M, Keynesianism’s responsibility for western civilization’s suicide, freudian psychology’s century long survival and all the damage it has done to individuals, Cantorian sets and the platonization of math and physics, scientific socialism and the loss of eastern Europe, and the postmodern and feminist attacks on the family – the central unit of reproduction.

So rationalists must warrant that they do no harm, scientists must not warrant, and do not warrant that they speak the truth. Only that they have done due diligence against doing harm to the informational commons via error bias and deception. Could we hold a court to convict both rationalists and scientists on the harm done by error, bias and deception, the prisons would be filled with rationalists and nearly empty of scientists.

Because the harm done by rationalists, is only exceeded by the great plagues. In that sense rationalism (justificationism) is an intellectual plague that we are justified in exterminating. (Which is to some small degree part of my work.)

(d) ” it is an interesting philosophy that states that philosophy is to be excluded from consideration.”
This statement requires that we agree on the term ‘philosophy’. Since in my work, I argue i think persuasively, that there isn’t any difference if both philosophy and science are subject to the same criterion. If science, philosophy, morality and law are not identical in content then someone is engaged in error, deception, or bias.

Instead, I state that rationalism (at least german and jewish rationalism) is a justificationary, authoritarian cult that has produced catastrophic harm to man on the same scale as scriptural monotheism, and only slightly less terrible than the great plagues.

And that is simply the result of looking at the evidence.


Hopefully I put this conversation into perspective, not only correcting a number of common rationalist fallacies.
It might be a bit to swallow, but that’s just how it is.

Curt Doolittle
The Propertarian Institute
L’viv Ukraine.


Another Critic

—“I wonder if Curt Doolittle would share with us which economic discipline ie Keynesianism or Friedman’s Chicagoan School that is more scientific than Austrian economics.”—Brian White


I can define ‘Scientific’ very precisely. I am not sure that I can define Austrian Economics so precisely – other than stating it as the two German and Cosmopolitan (Misesian/Rothbardian) branches. The germans did not make any pseudoscientific claims that I am aware of. However, Mises and Rothbard make expressly pseudoscientific arguments – not the least of which is conflating axiomatic (complete) systems for constructing proofs, with theoretical (incomplete) systems for constructing models. The definition of pseudoscientific is a claim that does not follow the scientific method. The scientific method however, is not in fact a method, but a set of moral constraints on warrantable (truthful) speech. Mises claims an axiomatic system is a science rather than a logic. This is simply false. (albeit his era was plagued with philosophical confusion as philosophy desperately attempted to attain the respectability of science. Today it is group with theology both in book stores and in academic budgets..)

—“Okay Curt I was more interested to know if there were other economic sciences that you concluded were more scientific”—Brian White


Logical fallacy.

Something is not more scientific than something else. The point of demarcation in science is whether the scientific method is used or not. As such practicing science is a binary proposition, not an analog proposition. So “more scientific” is not possible. Either someone follows the scientific method or one does not. The definition of ‘science’ is whether one practices the scientific method.

Economic science is practiced scientifically. Misesianism is the non-scientific branch of Austrian economics. All working economists today who call themselves Austrians (that I know of) practice empirical, scientific, economics. In other words, they are not Misesians.

Instead,working Austrians require praxeological testing (operational falsification) of economic theories rather than macro correlations alone. This is tantamount to placing two additional requirements on the scientific method: (a) that economic theories must be operationally falsifiable, and (b) that economic theories of policy must be stated such that they expose the degree of moral or immoral consequences.



The Difference Between “Operational” and “Intuitionistic”.


I use the term “Operational” in preference to “Intuitionistic” because the term “intuitionistic” is an uncomfortable one (like “rent-seeking”) that is open to easy misinterpretation, and the term “operational” invokes the meaning that I want it to: actions that humans can possibly take.

But this is a personal act of argumentative license. There is a significant difference between the terms Operational(actions we take to observe and measure) and Intuitionistic(physical and mental operations that it is possible for humans to perform).

In practice, when speaking tests of existential possibility, macro economic measures must be performed operationally, often using logical and physical instrumentation. But tests of existential possibility, rationality, and voluntary and involuntary transfer, require only sympathetic testing (reducing economic phenomenon to at least loosely rational sequence of actions that are subjectively believable).

So just as mathematical operations must be mentally possible and logically consistent (maintaining a balance of ratios), so must sequences of human actions be mentally possible (posses information to do so), subjectively consistent (what we often mistakenly call ‘rational’, but meaning preferential), and if physical action required, physically possible.

Lest someone leap to conclusions, The difference between mathematical systems and real world systems, is the difference between axiomatic(closed) and real (open) in which humans are constantly subject to information by which they can rearrange the priority of preferences in vast overlapping networks, as well as attempt to outwit one another (contrarian opportunism).

As such, since in an axiomatic system all information is present, and in a real-world(open) system, all information can never be present, our ability to deduce outcomes is dependent on the degree to which the information is closed (invariant): the more open the system is to new information the less predictive it can be – and as Taleb has demonstrated, shocks generate more consequential signals than predictable signals, and the information required to anticipate signals in the tail is many thousands of times higher than the same predictability within the primary distribution. Therefore while we can deduce general trends in economic phenomenon, we cannot deduce all economic phenomenon with any degree predictive success. Yet we can (usually) explain observed phenomenon given time.

This means that the Austrian program is largely correct: that economic policy will produce deterministic results. But the position of the main stream opposition is that the good achieved by manipulation is greater than the harm caused by economic distortion. (This remains the central subject of contention, since it will be very hard to prove on way or another.)

The general trend in economics has been one in which we attempt to provide that improvement by disallowing a shortage of money that would impede growth, by targeting various empirical measures of questionable use, and using the maximum borrowing capacity of the state as a means of inter-temporally adjusting investments in infrastructure and commons. But this emphasis has led to ignoring the means by which economies perform: demographics, education policy, industrial policy, rule of law, homogeneity of culture, and trust. In other words: taking human capital for granted under the false assumption of equality and the good of diversity.

And this is problematic, because the first most important criteria for economic performance in the absence of external inputs of technology, or military conquest, or possession of unique territory, is trust. And the corporeal state, multiculturalism, and universalism appear to erode that trust systematically – with predictable results.

So, while I may switch from Operationalism (broader) to Intuitionism (narrower) at present I prefer the broader term because of its general meaning and broader scope even though in economics the term Intuitionism is probably closer to corresponding with the purpose I intend: a requirement for the existential possibility of operations in order to criticize our assumptions (premises).

Curt Doolittle
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev, Ukraine


Science Is A Moral Discipline In Which We Struggle to Speak Truthfully

Science is a moral discipline wherein we criticize our ideas, so that we can speak them truthfully:

1— We test our reasoning with logic for internal consistency.
2— We test our observations with external correspondence.
3— We test the existential possibilities of our premises by defining them in operations.
4— We test the scope and limits of our theory with attempts at falsification.
5— We test the completeness of our theory with intertemporal accounting.
6— We test the consequences of our theories for externalities (involuntary transfers).

Once we have tested our theories by these means, then we can say that we speak truthfully – and as such do no harm.

Curt Doolittle
Testimonialism and Propertarianism
The Philosophy of Aristocracy 
The Propertarian Institute 
Kiev, Ukraine


Operationalism: From Law Through Mathematics


I hope that this spectrum: law, economics, assists us in understanding the position of praxeology in the list of moral constraints that require operational and intuitionistic tests of propositions, prior to making truth claims.

Strict Construction is an abused term where the courts instead use the terms Textualism and Original Intent. But under propertarian property rights theory Strict Construction refers to requiring that any law passed be accompanied by argument showing that such a law is specifically authorized by the constitution. In other words, laws constitute the permissible legal operations. And none of them can violate property rights. This is important because otherwise, if discretion is required, then judges can insert deception, imaginary content, bias and error into the body of law. (As they have done, circumventing the legislature, the constitution, and property rights.) As such the principle of Propertarian Strict Construction (as opposed to textualism’s strict construction) requires that we operationally define the construct of all any law. This principle is important because laws have the greatest affect on a polity – and often the greatest unintended effect upon individuals and the polity.

Intuitionism (praxeology) in economics is important because manipulation of the economy causes redistributions, gains and losses. As a moral constraint, it is only slightly less influential than law.

Operationism in psychology was important in the recent transformation of psychology from a pseudoscience, to an experimental discipline, and because psychologists do produce, and did produce negative externalities – harm, to others. Not the least of which was multiple generations suffering from illnesses cast as cognitive problems.

Medical treatments and tests are discussed as protocols.

Operationalism is physics was important because it demonstrated that we expended a great deal of time and money by NOT practicing operationalism and that Einstein’s innovation should have been much earlier and could have been if we had practiced it.

Intuitionism in mathematics was less important because there are few if any externalities produced by classical mathematical operations other than the psychological fallacy that there exists some separate mathematical reality.

Therefore the HIGHEST moral requirement for demonstration of construction is in the domain of economics wherein the greatest externalities are caused by economic policy.



Praxeology as Operationalism

If we cast Praxeology a failed attempt at constructing the economic equivalent of Operationalism in physics, Operationism in psychology, and Intuitionism in mathematics, all of which are tests of the existential possibility of premises, then we can rescue praxeology from the domain of pseudoscience, and instead, use it as an additional moral constraint on scientific argument: that no economic statement can be testified to be true, unless it can be constructed from sympathetically testable human operations. As such, praxeology is an extension of falsification within the scientific method: a form of criticism, wherein all premises are suspect, and as such, so are all deductions. And only through logical, empirical, and operational criticism can we warrant that our theory stands sufficient scrutiny for us to claim without moral hazard, that it may be true.” – Curt Doolittle


Macro Economic Phenomenon are Emergent and Explainable but not Deducible

Macro economic phenomenon are emergent, not deducible. They are often explainable. And the discipline of macro economics attempts to explain those phenomenon. Yet many phenomenon are still not yet explainable. Although rapid increase in economics in the past twenty years has improved the field dramatically.

Any given price for example, is often not explainable. Nor did we nor could we have deduced the stickiness of prices. Nor can we deduce the time frame of phenomenon.

It is true for example that in the long run, money may be neutral, but that does not mean that interference in the supply of money cannot be used to create beneficial temporary advantages even if they are neutralized over time.

It is true that unemployment will increase with minimum wages, but the reasons for this are not those proposed by cosmopolitan-Austrians. They are because people lose the possibility of entry into the work force when they are young and become permanently unemployable. Empirical evidence does not support the assumption that minor increases are statistically meaningful. Only that, say, in the french model, do we see statistically meaningful permanent unemployment.

So, emergent phenomenon are not deducible. They are instrumentally and empirically observable. And once observed may be explained by deduction. But this is indifferent from physical phenomenon, where phenomenon are emergent.

But to say that we can deduce all economic activity – all human action – from first principles is demonstrably false. We cannot.

To say that we can deduce all mathematical phenomenon, logical phenomenon, physical phenomenon from first principles is demonstrably false.

At scale, beyond our perceptions, we must rely upon empirical evidence for observation, instrumentation to obtain that evidence, and deduction to theorize the construction of those phenomenon.

The false-flag, straw-man argument against empiricism, states that we must be able to run tests, thereby constructing data sets, rather than merely observe phenomenon and explain that phenomenon. But science does not practice empiricism. It practices the scientific method. And physical science takes this experimental approach only to discover first principles, not to analyze emergent phenomenon. Red shift is not something we need to create conditions for, it is something we must simply observe.

Conversely, experimentally constructed evidence is LESS reliable than naturally occurring evidence. So experimentation is a means of creating conditions for observation. Observation is what is required for analysis.

Likewise, we do not need to discover the first principles of man, but we must discover and explain the emergent phenomenon of man’s actions.

And even in those cases where we can construct a very loose economic principle, that does not mean that we cannot take action to alter the interstitial conditions and conduct experiments upon how we can effect those conditions and for how long. The Keynesian argument is that even if the Austrian business cycle is true, the good obtained in the interim is worth the risk, because states under fiat currency – unless they overextend by war and shock – cannot fail and become insolvent.

In any and all cases of the anti-scientific arguments put forth by the rothbardian rationalists I will easily demonstrate that each case is a straw man argument.

Because that is the technique of Critique: the marxist and cosmopolitan device of creating a straw man argument that is sufficiently obscurant that it is possible to load, frame, and overload the average, and even above average human mind.

It is the greatest form of deception ever constructed by man.

While we can look back in awe at monotheism as a great deception for the purpose of imposing authoritarian rule – despite its absurdity. And while we can look back in awe at how successful the marxists were. We can also grasp that libertinism (the cosmopolitan wing of Austrian economics) is yet another instance of the same technique: create an unbelievable lie, repeat it, and defend it with straw men. Libertinism is merely cosmopolitan separatism in new dress. It didnt’ work, it wont work, and it can’t work.

Libertines cannot hold land. And he who holds land determines the basis of law. That is an inescapable law of human action.

Curt Doolittle
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev, Ukraine