The enlightenment mythos was almost as damaging was christianity. The greatest tragedy in human history may have been the christianization of Europe. The empirical side of the enlightenment was desperately needed to escape jewish mysticism that held us in ignorance for a millennia. Equality under the law, was important for the spread of commerce.

But, just as moving people from christianity’s mysticism via Darwin was, let’s say … incomplete, it is very hard to move people from equality of property rights, equality under the law, and the equality of family interests, to what the socialists accomplished, which was equality of opportunity, material equality, inequality under the law, eradication of the common law by legislative law, and the destruction of the nuclear and absolute nuclear family in pursuit of ‘individualism’.

We have a very hard time overturning this mythos. This mythos is even rampant in libertarianism. Libertarians are just as enamored of the fallacy of equality as are socialists. Libertarians want to retain meritocracy, sure. But most of us assume the same naive belief that if others ‘only understood’ they would adopt our system of values.

But that’s just demonstrably false, both logically, praxeologically, and empirically. The majority of the world detests property rights and individualism.

 

It isn’t’ just that the majority cannot join the aristocracy, and earn, use and keep property rights. It is that they do not desire to earn, use and keep property rights. People want the benefits of aristocracy but not the effort. They want to be serfs. They want to be taken care of. They don’t want to bear risks. They don’t want to compete, And they aren’t able to. And they demonstrate it at every opportunity.

Having empirically proven that the enlightenment effort to bring all of mankind into the aristocracy, has been a catastrophic failure, and at present is threatening western civilization; the question is then, whether we abandon the enlightenment goal of an ‘aristocracy of everybody’, and demand property rights by force of arms once again, as we previously civilized the barbarians of the world, or whether we let ourselves, our civilization and aristocracy die.

Not with a roar of triumph. Not with a whimper. But with silent cowardice.

 

 

I have been struggling with this idea for a while: that, for some reason, of the empirical fields, including math, physics, engineering, computer science, and economics (into which I include the social sciences), it appears that platonism seems to originate in philosophical spiritualism, gain legitimacy in mathematics and roll downhill until it is cleansed by computer scientists and engineers.

What’s interesting to me, is that it just seems, in all the fields, that platonism is the definition of most philosophy, so pervasive in math, to the point of being endemic and inescapable and impervious to correction, even if it doesn’t need to be.

…Human Beings As They Dream…
…………..Philosophy…………………….
………………Logic…………………………
……………–Math–……………………..
……..Physical…….Behavioral………….
..(constant vs inconstant relations)…
…….Physics………Economics………….
………….(observation)…………………..
Engineering—Computer Science…..
………….(interaction)…………………….
…Human Beings As They Really Act..

It’s just strange that the only empirical people you seem to be able to trust are people who work with machines. ‘Cause they can tell the difference between an abstract name for something and the operational process for bringing it into being. Computer scientists never make this mistake. Mathematicians do all the time, and actually defend what they do not themselves understand.

I have heard a lot of criticism of engineers and computer scientists over the past few decades and I’ve just found that sure, in any discipline there are idiots. There are ‘scientistic’ physicists too, and ‘financial economists’. But the difference between fields is the use of operational language, and operational language isn’t platonic.

That’s what makes ‘science’ into ‘science’.
– OPERATIONAL LANGUAGE = HUMAN ACTION.
Human action that is open to sympathetic testing – experience.
Praxeology was backwards.
You can sympathetically test something.
You cant deduce much from that tho.

 

One’s moral priorities are not a choice, but a justification that has been reduced to an intuition. They must be – reason would be too expensive and too unpredictable for the formation of norms. And those intuitions, which we are in the process of confirming, are both genetically and familially determined. And the structure of the family is determined by the structure of economic production on one hand, and the spectrum of cousin marriage from taboo to expectation, on the other.

->Genetics, Family structure, Production Outbreeding, Norms, Mythology, and Pedagogy.

In fact, the only reason we see migration in moral biases is so that individuals can demonstrate wealth, opportunity, and freedom from mercantile and manorial ethics as a form of conspicuous consumption and therefore as a status and mating signal.

The origins of our universalism are a side effect of the success of the church in prohibiting cousin marriage and granting property rights to women as a means of breaking up the large landholding families so that the church could more easily and cheaply buy land.

America was homogenous in indoctrinating everyone into the Absolute Nuclear Family because immigration displaced extended family networks and the economy in the states prohibited prior loyalties because of available growth. Black americans had an even higher rate of marriage than whites.

But the postmodern and feminist programs have undermined the absolute nuclear family using both academia, public intellectuals, policy, and law; because of the introduction of female voters into the work place, and voting pools gave each group new constituent – customers.

And it has consistently been the voting pattern of women to expand the welfare state, remove the need for marriage before reproduction, and remove the punitive economic and social norms for single motherhood. At this point voting is determined by single women. And we will soon reach the point where 40% or more of children are born to single mothers, who must singularly support a household, and as such will be poorer than married people with two incomes who support a household.

And that is what we see in voting patterns. White married women vote right to keep their family and income. Unmarried and single women and minorities (non-whites, since minority status is rapidly approaching in younger demographics), vote to seek rents and free-riding.

I work on the other side of the spectrum from the status-seeking, conspicuously consumptive, moral justification of redistribution as a replacement for marriage. My objective is the preservation of the high trust society. But the high trust society is a product of the absolute nuclear family as the dominant moral influence in American culture. And what we are seeing, is, in 50 years, it’s rapid decline, and the economic polarization, and moral polarization, of the country along those moral lines.

We cannot keep the high trust society, and the positive benefits that come from it, without the ANF and the moral code that accompanies it. Or, there is no evidence that such a thing is possible.

But, it appears, that at least for a rapidly increasing number of women, this circumstance is superior to the corporation by which we concentrate capital: marriage.

Monogamy and paternalism, as Engels reminded us, were innovations that were the result of the development of property during agrarianism and pastoralism.

But if women can marry the state, rather than a man, they can restore the tribal order, and bear children while placing the burden of their upkeep on the tribe (state).

And that appears to be both normal and preferential.

So I think this is a more likely cause of today’s circumstance than leftover anger at the ‘war of northern aggression’, the purpose of which was to prevent the agrarian, export-oriented south from using slavery in the new territory to form a political block, that could encircle the import-oriented north.

Reproduction and status are an economy.
Norms are an economy.
Production is an economy.
And moral discourse is verbal warfare over which sector will win which benefits.

Cheers

 

1450335_10152033898062264_1997839827_n 996064_10152033897577264_2079412274_n 1465242_10152033898302264_303625332_n 1470159_10152033898727264_447792701_n 1417809_10152033898767264_1043102633_o 1462907_10152033947617264_467185008_n 1451367_10152033947242264_1319608002_n

 

We had it backwards. Aristocracy simply didn’t adapt to the change in membership in the cult of property rights fast enough.

If you can’t convince the anti-aristocrats to go along and create an ‘aristocracy of everybody’ promised by the enlightenment, then the alternative is natural Aristocracy: Self Defense.

Pay people to get married, cohabitate, and breed. Pay the poor and unable, not to have children. Tax, impoverish, and punish those that are dependent. Care for the physically disabled.

Just how it is. Otherwise. No families. No morality. No high trust. Married class vs unmarried class warfare.

 

1. THERE IS ONLY ONE LAW AND THAT IS PROPERTY.

All else is a command given by man.

2. THE ONLY NUMBERS ARE NATURAL NUMBERS.

All else is ratio and relation.

3. THERE IS ONLY ONE MEANS OF REASON, AND THAT IS NATURALISM.

All else is deception or self deception.

 

(not profound, but almost) (good Austrian argumentative material)

I need to update Peter Boettke’s definition of Austrian Economics to include the reasons WHY certain groups of people are morally and intellectual attracted to the Austrian model, rather than just the methodological differences:

1) The testability of incentives as rational
2) The visibility of voluntary versus involuntary transfers
3) The visibility of the redistribution of risk to entrepreneurs, and the impact on entrepreneurial incentives.
4) The visibility of the impact on opportunity costs.
5) The visibility of the cumulative effect on opportunity costs.
6) The visibility of decline in linguistic, rational, social, moral, mythological, and institutional capital.

The longer your time preference the higher the cost of the portfolio of opportunity costs. (I should diagram this out a bit.)

It was very frustrating to read the number articles of late that just put us outside the consensus, and paint us as extremists. I mean, I know that *I* agree with the mainstream: they affect what they measure. They achieve their short term objectives. But I disagree with the mainstream that the accumulation of externalities is inferior to the short term benefits.

I don’t think honest progressives like Karl Smith disagree that there may be a cumulative effect of continuous distortion of the monetary system. I think they just feel that the moral good in the short term is greater than the risk and damage in the long.

Now, I was right in my prediction, and Paul Krugman was wrong, that voters would absolutely NOT tolerate what they viewed was immoral behavior; and that the Germans would simply adjust Europe slowly rather than allow ‘immoral’ redistribution, or financially expensive adjustments to occur rapidly. Politics is a moral, not empirical exercise. (See my post on Paul Krugman’s Moral Blindness). And he couldn’t grasp that. The first problem of politics may be the suppression of violence. But the SECOND problem of politics, is the suppression of free riding. It doesn’t matter the size of the group, whether tribe or nation.

Now, just because we are too unsophisticated to measure the impact on moral, social, calculative-coordinative, and institutional capital except in the longer term, because we don’t know how to price it, doesn’t mean that that stock of capital, priced or not, doesn’t increase or decrease. Or that we do not depend on that stock of capital as much or more than any other.

So, given that the math in economics isn’t really all that challenging (knowing which data to pull, and its construction is), it’s not that Austrians are afraid of empirical work. (Although we get more nuts and fruits because we lack that filtration system). Its that what we care to measure doesn’t leave behind a record of prices. And opportunity costs dont create a record of prices. Furthermore, the use of large scale aggregates, launders all causality from the analysis.

And in our view of the world, basing policy on these aggregates, unless it is extremely TACTICAL and LOCAL (loans, and debt forgiveness), pays the vast majority of attention is to that which matters very little, and ignores that which matters very much.

We can spend down social and moral capital, just as we can spend down environmental capital, but we must give these things a few generations to recover. We have been spending it down for over fifty years. Probably a century as of 2014.

I think our side does disagree with the fact that ‘it’s all demand’. And I am not certain that we are right. I’m certain that there are extremely negative consequences for stimulating demand unless it’s given directly to consumers as cash by bypassing the financial system. But the cumulative effect on the quality of goods and services still appears to diminish – although proving that’s a very hard task of teasing signal from noise.

The stock of capital that troubles me most, because of the Marxist, Freudian, Postmodern, and Feminist attacks on the meaning of terms via obscurant language, is the stock of metaphysical bias embedded in the language. It’s eroded pretty consistently since the first world war. Even if our scientific language (nod to Flynn) is increasing, our stock of moral capital in the language is declining rapidly. This stock is what the Postmoderns attempt to ‘steal’ from the commons. And they are very good at stealing.

So, in POLITICAL ECONOMY I tend to look at our biases as a division of knowledge and labor along time preferences. With Austrians and conservatives with very long time preference (aristocrats) and common people with shorter time preferences, and most progressives simply displaying conspicuous consumption as a means of demonstrating status.

I don’t really care about the mathematical and procedural Platonists. They’re everywhere. But that’s an entirely different battle.

Austrian Economics isn’t a debate over method. Thats a nonsensical sideshow. It’s a debate over priorities. Our methods are different because our TIME PREFERENCE is different – and we don’t have the LUXURY of taking the EASY way out, because our stock of preferred capital isn’t PRICED. It’s just HARDER to do what we do.

That is how we must position it. And with that positioning we wipe out the influence of the … ahem, silly ideological pseudo-Austrians bent on stealing our name and identity.

That’s my mission with reforming libertarianism anyway.

Cheers
Curt Doolittle

 

Dear libertarian(s)

Some of your statements trouble me, because we need passionate and articulate advocacy of libertarianism. And you’re clearly a passionate and articulate advocate. But it’s better if all of us are the best quality advocates possible, so that we reduce internal friction as wasted effort, and direct it elsewhere where it can be more benefit to liberty.

As Caplan has recently argued, Libertarians tend to behave as moral specialists. The cause of this behavior is the libertarian sentiment – the bias against coercion, and the forced sacrifice of opportunity that causes no loss either directly or by externality. But the problem with sentimental and moral arguments is that they since they ARE intuitive, and intuition is limited to whatever it is that we have mastered by experience.

In order to agree with Bastiat and Hayek (which, like you I do) we must also intuit that they are morally correct. But that we intuit that they are correct is not sufficient to argue apodeictically (rationally) or scientifically (empirically) that they are correct independent of that intuition.

Propertarianism
…prior to Hoppe and Rothbard, the classical liberal … program had failed to produce a … rational, analytical argument for liberty that was anywhere near the argumentative depth and veracity of marxism.

To understand the contributions of the Anarcho-Capistalist movement, of Rothbard and Hoppe to the advance of liberty, libertarian ethics, and libertarian institutions, we need only appreciate that prior to Hoppe and Rothbard, the classical liberal (libertarian) program had failed to produce a non-intuitive, rational, analytical argument for liberty that was anywhere near the argumentative depth and veracity of marxism. Had it not been for Rothbard and Hoppe in ethics and Friedman in Economics, and Hayek in politics the world might be a very different place.

It is arguable that the conservative intellectual program has been a failure even if the political program has been a strategic success. And conversely, our intellectual program has been a success, but by empirical standards, a political failure.

The reason we have failed is Rothbard’s ‘ghetto’ ethics are not only intuitively insufficient for the majority who possess classical liberal ethics – they are intuitively reprehensible to them. And for an intuitive system of ethics to evoke intuitively negative emotions is politically problematic. It’s a non-starter. And for us it has been.

Propertarianism
What is it that conservatives cannot rationally articulate or empirically demonstrate, but ‘sells’, and what what is it about our ethics we can rationally articulate but cannot sell?

If we again look at what the conservatives have accomplished by focusing entirely on the moral sentiments, and not on ratio-scientific argument, it’s instructive. What is it that conservatives cannot rationally articulate or empirically demonstrate, but ‘sells’, and what what is it about our ethics we can rationally articulate but cannot sell?

I think I know that answer: and it is what is missing from Rothbardian and Anarcho capitalist ethics. Rothbard gave us the ethics of the ghetto – an ethic of rebellion. He did not give us the ethics of the high trust society – the aristocratic egalitarian, Christian, Protestant ethic of the high trust society, in which symmetry of knowledge is mandated by warranty, and externality is prohibited by morality and law.

While the Anarcho Capitalist program is certainly incomplete (I would like to complete it), it is the only advance in political theory that is substantive in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Rothbard reduced all rights to property rights. And he restated history to demonstrate that assertion. It was a fundamental insight, and provided us with an analytical language for responding to marxists. But his analysis of the scope of those rights is artificially narrow, and he provided us with no institutional means of obtaining or holding those rights – possibly because he could not solve the problem of institutions. I am extremely critical of Rothbard for these reasons, because he gave us both an insufficient definition of what is moral, and what is essentially a toothless voluntary religion to hold it with.

Hoppe has explained to us the incentives of why democracy fails, and why monarchy succeeded. He has tried to give us institutions that will provide services without monopoly bureaucracy, or even legislative law. Hoppe solved the problem of institutions – at least in a homogenous polity – and he did it in rigorous language.

He did not solve the problem of heterogeneous polities. (I think I may have, but I am not sure yet.) Neither of these insights were minimal in impact. Rothbard effectively made ethics non-arbitrary, and Hoppe provided a means of ethical governance. Both of them did this by eliminating the monopoly power of government.

Hoppe’s weaknesses are a) he relies argumentatively on rational rather than ratio-scientific arguments, which while I might argue are functionally correct, are causally weak, and we now have the ratio-scientific evidence to prove them without relying on complex (and nearly indefensible) rational arguments alone. b) That he is excessively fawning of Rothbard, for personally legitimate reasons – but that Rothbard is sufficiently tainted by the failure of his moral arguments to hinder Hoppe’s legacy, and his arguments. c) Style issues are those of politically active moralism against Marxists. His native german prose only lends itself to anglo articulation after he has reduced it through repetition. He uncomfortably peppers it with unnecessary ridicule as did Rothbard – which I have been consistently critical of, and which he has slowly laundered from his formal works, but not his speech – because it is in fact highly entertaining to audiences.

These are problems of argumentative method alone, not of intellectual contribution. Hoppe has given us solutions to serious political problems that are two and a half millennia old. That he did so in the language of his time is something to be acknowledged, but the results simply appreciated for the visionary insights that they are.

Propertarianism
…just because we agree with something, and we intuit it, is meaningless, since that is exactly what the people on the other pole of the moral spectrum inuit. Intuitions must be defensible.

We cannot say that one is rationally or scientifically arguing for something without a rational or scientific argument. The fact that we are moral specialists, and rely upon moral arguments, and moral arguments that are intuitive to us, may in fact, suggest that our intuitions are correct, if and only if we can ALSO support those intuitions with rational, scientific and institutional solutions. Otherwise, the fact that we intuit liberty to be something moral, is merely an accident of evolutionary biology and nothing meaningful can be said about it.

So I would caution you, and most libertarians, who are, in fact, sentimental, rather than rational, ratio-scientific, and institutionally empirical, advocates, that just because we agree with something, and we intuit it, is meaningless, since that is exactly what the people on the other pole of the moral spectrum inuit. Intuitions must be defensible.

So while I assume you agree with Bob Murphy (who is our best economist) and Bastiat (who is the father of our institutional rhetoric), I would argue that you correctly intuit classical liberal ethics of the high trust society. In this sense you are superior in intuition to Rothbardian intuitionists.

However, we must also acknowledge that the classical liberal political system failed upon the introduction of women and non-property owners into enfranchisement. This is because those without property hold very different ethics – if ethics can be used to describe them. And the female reproductive strategy is to bear children and place the burden of their upkeep on the tribe (society). Private property was an innovation, that allowed males to once again take control of reproductive strategy, and the marriage that resulted from that innovation was a truce between the male and female strategies. A truce that feminists and socialists, and communists, and those that lack property, all seek to break. Private Property and the nuclear family, and the high trust ethic are both politically indivisible. And the classical liberal program cannot survive in their absence.

And no one else has provided us with a solution to this problem other than the feminists and socialists – who which to destroy private property, and the anarcho capitalists, who wish to preserve our freedom, and property.

And as far as I know, I am the only libertarian who is trying to solve the problem of freedom in the absence of the nuclear family that functioned as a uniform reproductive order now that we are in the order of production we call the industrial and technical age.

So these are not questions of sentimental intuition, or belief, or morality. They are questions of institutional, philosophical, and argumentative solutions to the problem of cooperation when the agrarian order of the nuclear and extended family has been replaced by the individualistic and familially diverse.

Political theory is not a trivial pursuit.

Cheers
Curt Doolittle
Kiev.

 

Dear libertarian(s)

Some of your statements trouble me, because we need passionate and articulate advocacy of libertarianism. And you’re clearly a passionate and articulate advocate. But it’s better if all of us are the best quality advocates possible, so that we reduce internal friction as wasted effort, and direct it elsewhere where it can be more benefit to liberty.

As Caplan has recently argued, Libertarians tend to behave as moral specialists. The cause of this behavior is the libertarian sentiment – the bias against coercion, and the forced sacrifice of opportunity that causes no loss either directly or by externality. But the problem with sentimental and moral arguments is that they since they ARE intuitive, and intuition is limited to whatever it is that we have mastered by experience.

In order to agree with Bastiat and Hayek (which, like you I do) we must also intuit that they are morally correct. But that we intuit that they are correct is not sufficient to argue apodeictically (rationally) or scientifically (empirically) that they are correct independent of that intuition.

To understand the contributions of the Anarcho-Capistalist movement, of Rothbard and Hoppe to the advance of liberty, libertarian ethics, and libertarian institutions, we need only appreciate that prior to Hoppe and Rothbard, the classical liberal (libertarian) program had failed to produce a non-intuitive, rational, analytical argument for liberty that was anywhere near the argumentative depth and veracity of marxism. Had it not been for Rothbard and Hoppe in ethics and Friedman in Economics, and Hayek in politics the world might be a very different place.

It is arguable that the conservative intellectual program has been a failure even if the political program has been a strategic success. And conversely, our intellectual program has been a success, but by empirical standards, a political failure.

The reason we have failed is Rothbard’s ‘ghetto’ ethics are not only intuitively insufficient, to the majority who possess classical liberal ethics. The are intuitively reprehensible to them. And for an intuitive system of ethics to evoke intuitively negative emotions is politically problematic. It’s a non-starter. And for us it has been. If we again look at what the conservatives have accomplished by focusing entirely on the moral sentiments, and not the ratio-scientific argument, it’s instructive. What is it that conservatives cannot rationally articulate or empirically demonstrate, but ‘sells’, and what what is it about our ethics we can rationally articulate but cannot sell? I think I know that answer: and it is what is missing from Rothbardian and Anarcho capitalist ethics. Rothbard gave us the ethics of the ghetto – an ethic of rebellion. He did not give us the ethics of the high trust society – the aristocratic egalitarian, Christian, Protestant ethic of the high trust society, in which symmetry of knowledge is mandated by warranty, and externality is prohibited by morality and law.

While the Anarcho Capitalist program is certainly incomplete (I would like to complete it), it is the only advance in political theory that is substantive in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Rothbard reduced all rights to property rights. And he restated history to demonstrate that assertion. It was a fundamental insight, and provided us with an analytical language for responding to marxists. But his analysis of the scope of those rights is artificially narrow, and he provided us with no institutional means of obtaining or holding those rights – possibly because he could not solve the problem of institutions. I am extremely critical of Rothbard for these reasons, because he gave us both an insufficient definition of what is moral, and what is essentially a toothless voluntary religion to hold it with. Hoppe has explained to us the incentives of why democracy fails, and why monarchy succeeded. He has tried to give us institutions that will provide services without monopoly bureaucracy, or even legislative law. Hoppe solved the problem of institutions – at least in a homogenous polity – and he did it in rigorous language. He did not solve the problem of heterogeneous polities. (I think I may have, but I am not sure yet.) Neither of these insights were minimal in impact. Rothbard effectively made ethics non-arbitrary, and Hoppe provided a means of ethical governance. Both of them did this by eliminating the monopoly power of government.

Hoppe’s weaknesses are a) c) he relies argumentatively on rational rather than ratio-scientific arguments, which while I might argue are functionally correct, are causally weak, and we now have the ratio-scientific evidence to prove them without relying on complex (and nearly indefensible) rational arguments alone. b) That he is excessively fawning of Rothbard, for personally legitimate reasons – but that Rothbard is sufficiently tainted by the failure of his moral arguments to hinder Hoppe’s legacy, and his arguments. c) Style issues are those of politically active moralism against Marxists. His native german prose only lends itself to anglo articulation after he has reduced it through repetition. He uncomfortably peppers it with unnecessary ridicule as did Rothbard – which I have been consistently critical of, and which he has slowly laundered from his formal works, but not his speech – because it is in fact highly entertaining to audiences.

These are problems of argumentative method alone, not of intellectual contribution. Hoppe has given us solutions to serious political problems that are two and a half millennia old. That he did so in the language of his time is something to be acknowledged, but the results simply appreciated for the visionary insights that they are.

We cannot say that one is rationally or scientifically arguing for something without a rational or scientific argument. The fact that we are moral specialists, and rely upon moral arguments, and moral arguments that are intuitive to us, may in fact, suggest that our intuitions are correct, if and only if we can ALSO support those intuitions with rational, scientific and institutional solutions. Otherwise, the fact that we intuit liberty to be something moral, is merely an accident of evolutionary biology and nothing meaningful can be said about it.

So I would caution you, and most libertarians, who are, in fact, sentimental, rather than rational, ratio-scientific, and institutionally empirical, advocates, that just because we agree with something, and we intuit it, is meaningless, since that is exactly what the people on the other pole of the moral spectrum inuit. Intuitions must be defensible.

So while I assume you agree with Bob Murphy (who is our best economist) and Bastiat (who is the father of our institutional rhetoric), I would argue that you correctly intuit classical liberal ethics of the high trust society. In this sense you are superior in intuition to Rothbardian intuitionists.

However, we must also acknowledge that the classical liberal political system failed upon the introduction of women and non-property owners into enfranchisement. This is because those without property hold very different ethics – if ethics can be used to describe it, And the female reproductive strategy is to bear children and place the burden of their upkeep on the tribe (society). Private property was an innovation, that allowed males to once again take control of reproductive strategy, and the marriage that resulted from that innovation was a truce between the male and female strategies. A truce that feminists and socialists, and communists, and those that lack property, all seek to break. Private Property and the nuclear family, and the high trust ethic are both politically indivisible. And the classical liberal program cannot survive in their absence.

And no one else has provided us with a solution to this problem other than the feminists and socialists – who which to destroy private property, and the anarcho capitalists, who wish to preserve our freedom, and property.

And as far as I know, I am the only libertarian who is trying to solve the problem of freedom in the absence of the nuclear family as a uniform reproductive order in the order of production we call the industrial and technical age.

So these are not questions of sentimental intuition, or belief, or morality. They are questions of institutional, philosophical, and argumentative solutions to the problem of cooperation when the agrarian order of the nuclear and extended family has been replaced by the individualistic and familially diverse.

Political theory is not a trivial pursuit.

Cheers
Curt Doolittle
Kiev.

 

THE SOURCE OF PROPERTY: THE NECESSITY, VIRTUE AND MORALITY OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE

I (we) may not be able to coerce you into accepting freedom – individual monopoly of control over property obtained by voluntary exchange production or homesteading – as a superior form of cooperation to all other forms of cooperation. But you may not coerce me (us) into abandoning freedom as our preferred, committed, required, demanded and threatened form of cooperation.

THE SOURCE OF PROPERTY IS VIOLENCE

The source of property is the use of violence to create, obtain, and protect it.
Only those who performed militial service created private property.
Only those who performed militial service obtained private property.
Only those who perform militial service will keep private property.

A militia is a voluntary alliance of property owners whose common interest is the preservation of private property rights. A militia is not the same as an army, any more than freedom is the same as liberty. You create freedom by using violence. You request or desire liberty from someone else.

The purpose of a libertarian government is to create private property through the organized application of violence to create it. And libertarian pacifists and moralists are in fact the reason we are losing it.

VIOLENCE IS A VIRTUE.
Violence is a virtue not a vice. If all rights are property rights. If property defines morality, then violence to create property is the first moral action upon which all other morality rests.

We should encourage the mastery of violence in all men at all times, and the exercise of violence by all men at all times, in the defense of property rights, the highest form of morality that a man can display.

Because by acts of violence to preserve property he pays the highest contribution to morality possible.

Defense of property does not require words. It requires actions.

FREEDOM IS SYNONYMOUS WITH MILITIA
The only free people are, and must be, a people whose government is a militia, and whose resolution of disputes over property is decided by judges using the single rule of private property as their criteria for adjudication. A militia is synonymous with enfranchisement. No one else has paid for his or her right of property. They merely free ride on the expenses of others.

Therefore, political democracy is synonymous with militial participation. No other meaning is possible. All other attributions are acts of theft by fraud.

Militial participation requires no more than the personal use of violence to protect property rights. The use of the militia is to create and preserve property rights. The use of judges is to resolve conflicts without violence. The use of democratic government is not to create laws, but to create physical commons. The use of public intellectuals, is to carry on the public debate over which commons we may choose to invest in, and which not. The use of ‘religion’ and literature is to teach us these necessary and immutable laws of human cooperation so that we never forget them – and by forgetting them lose our freedom.

You cannot obtain the right of private property at a discount. It is an extremely costly right to possess. It is an extremely costly right to maintain. Those who attempt to gain freedom – property – at a discount, will obtain an inferior product to those who pay for a better one. And the only currency of freedom -property – is violence.

Be armed. Be willing. Be vigilant. And Act.

—–
Curt Doolittle
Kiev, 2013
“Putting violence back into liberty one sentence at a time.”

 
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